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ABSTRACT 
One proof of existence of general equilibrium assumes convexity 
and continuity of a preference correspondence on a compact convex 
feasible set W. Here we show the existence of a local equilibrium 
for a preference field which satisfies, not convexity, but the 
weaker local acyclicity. The theorem is then applied to a voting 
game,o, without veto players. It is shown that if the dimension 
of the policy space is no greater than v(o)-2, where v(o) is the 
Nakumura number of the game, then no local cycles may occur and a 
local equilibrium must exist. With convex preferences then there 
will exist a choice of the game fr<iJIJ\ W. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Proof of the existence of a general economic equilibrium, 
without the assumption of transitivity of individual preference 
was obtained by Sonnenschein [21], essentially using a version of 
Ky Fan's Theorem [6]. The method of proof was to construct a 
preference correspondence satisfying certain convexity and continuity 
properties. In general social choice processes, involving coalitions 
of players, the assumption of individual convex preference is 
insufficient to guarantee convex social preference, However Greenberg 
[9] showed that, for a q-majority game (where any coalition of q or more 
players from the society of size n is a winning coalition) on a compact 
convex subset of euclidean space, of dimension w, if w < q/( ) then n-q 
convex individual preference guarantees convex social preference. Consequently 
Sonnenschein's theorem can be used to prove existence of a voting 
equilibrium or choice. 
In this paper we extend Greenberg's Theorem in two directions. 
First of all we demonstrate how to extend the theorem to deal with 
an arbitrary weighted voting game a without vetoers. For any such 
game a "stability dimension" v*(a) can be computed. We show that 
if individual preferences are smooth, though not necessarily convex, 
and the policy space W has dimension no greater than v*(a), then 
there can exist no "local voting cycles". Secondly we use the Ky 
Fan Theorem to show that if the policy space is compact convex, and 
if the voting game has no local cycles, then there must exist a 
"local" voting equilibrium. When we reimpose the assumption of 
convexity of individual preference, then the "local" equilibrium 
must be a choice, or core, of the game in W. 
Since the stability dimension v*(a) for a q-majority game is 
the largest integer strictly less than q/�-q/ we obtain an alternative 
proof of Greenberg's theorem. 
2 
Moreover the result on non-existence of local cycles is significant 
because of the relationship that this property has to the impossibility 
of agenda manipulation [11] and to the existence of well behaved "gradient" 
planning procedures [12,25] 
1. AN EQUILIBRIUM THEOREM 
Let w be a set of alternatives, and P: W + W a preference correspondence, 
where P(x) is the set of points in W preferred to the point x. 
The choice of P from the set W is the set 
C(P, W) {xEW:P(x) 
An important question concerns those properties of P and W which are 
sufficient to guarantee the nonemptiness of the choice set C(P,W). 
Let pGW x W be the preference relation induced on W by P, where 
xpy iff x, y&W and xEP(y). Then the preference correspondence P (or 
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equivalently the preference relation p) is acyclic if f there exists no 
finite subset {x, y1, • • .  , yr
} of W such that xpy1py2 . • .  pyrpx. 
When W is a finite set and P is acyclic then, by (18), there exists 
a nonempty choice set C(P,W), 
More generally suppose that W is a topological space. The preference 
correspondence P:W + W is 
a) 
b) 
c) 
lower demi-continuous (ldc) iff, for each xeW the lower preference 
-1 set P (x) {y6W:xeP(y)} is open in W 
upper demi-continuous (udc) iff for each xeW, the upper preference 
set P(x) {yuW:yeP (x)} is open in W 
continuous iff P is both ldc. and udc. 
Walker (24) has shown that if W is compact, and P is acyclic and ldc. 
then there exists a choice of P from W. 
In many contexts in economic theory and social choice there is no 
reason for the preference correspondence under examination to be acyclic, 
However both Ky Fan [6] and Sonnenschein (21) have shown that an appropriate 
convexity property for the preference correspondence can be substituted for 
acyclicity. Say that the preference correspondence P is semi-convex 
iff W is a convex set in a topological vector space Y and for no x�W 
does x belong to ConP(x), the convex hull of P(x) in W. By Ky Fan 
(6), if W is admissible (both convex and compact) and p is lower demi-
continuous and semi-convex then there exists a choice x of P from W 
such that P(x) 
Ky Fan's Theorem is valid for W a subset of a topological linear 
space Y of arbitrary dimension. However if Y is euclidean space 
R w of finite dimension w, then the continuity requirement can be 
weakened, Say a correspondence P:W + W is lower hemi-continuous (lhc) 
iff for all xt.W, and any open set UC W such that P(x) ()U f cp, then 
there is an open neighbourhood V of x in W such that P(x')nu f cp for 
all x'� V. Clearly if a correspondence is ldc. then it is lhc. A fixed 
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point argument due to Bergstrom, [2], shows that for the finite dimensional 
case, lower demi-continuity can be weakened to lower hemi-continuity in 
the Ky Fan Theorem (see [17 ] for further discussion). 
Greenberg, [9], has used the Ky Fan-Sonnenschein theorem to show 
existence of a choice in a particular voting game. More specifically 
let N {l, • • •  , n} be a society with n members, and suppose the 
ith individual has a preference correspondence Pi:W + W. For coalition M in N, 
define 
Note that if each Pi' for iPM, is ldc. then so is PM. However 
if each Pi is lhc then PM need not be lhc. For this reason we assume 
lower demi-continuity of preference. A simple voting game o is defined 
in terms of a class ,fJ of winning coalitions. The social preference 
correspondence P0:W + W of the voting game is then given by 
P0(x) 
u 
M""° P M(x) ' 
Thus ycP0(x) iff there exists some MGi) such that yePM (x). 
Greenberg examined a q-majority rule, o , where the integer q 
q < n "specifies the smallest number of individuals that can enforce 
a change". In other words the class of winning coalitions /j for o q q 
is given by ,lJ q {MCN: IMI .'.:. q}. 
Suppose now that W is a compact,convex subset of JRw, and that each 
individual has a continuous and semi-convex preference correspondence. 
Greenberg [9,Theorem 2] showed that when w < _L n-q then the q-maj ority 
preference correspondence P0 is also continuous and semi-convex. 
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q -By the Ky Fan Theorem there exists a choice x in W such that P0 (x) $• q 
In other words there exists no alternative yew such that y is preferred 
to x by at least q individuals. 
Note that Greenberg's Theorem is only valid for an anonymous 
simple voting game, in which it is precisely the number of players 
in a coalition that determines whether the coalition is winning or not. 
We can generalize Greenberg's Theorem to cover an arbitrary 
(weighted) voting game o by introducing the Nakamura [13] number of o. 
Let /J be a family of subsets of N. Define the ))-collegium C(j)) of IJ by 
C(/J) = QM. 
If the class� of winning coalitions of a voting game,o , has nonempty 
collegium then o is called collegial, and the Nakamura number is defined to be oo. 
If the game is collegial, then the members of the collegium are also called veto 
players, If o is not collegial, then define v(o) by 
v(o) min{j�•j:,rl'c,Q and c(f;') $}. 
In other words v(o) is the cardinality of the smallest subfamily /)' 
of the family IJ of winning coalitions of o such that /J' has an empty 
collegium. 
When a is a simple voting game with Nakamura number v(o), define the 
stability dimension of a to be v*(-0) = v(o)-2. 
Call a nonempty compact and convex subset of W of lR.m an 
admissible space. The dimension, w, of W is the dimension of the affine 
manifold spanned by W. 
Theorem 1 Let o be a voting game for a society N {l, . • .  ,n} 
on an admissible space W of dimension w. 
If each individual has semi-convex and continuous preferences on W, 
and if w .::_ v*(o) then there exists a choice xr::W for Pcr from W • • 
This theorem, proved below, has also been obtained by Strnad [22,23] . 
To show that Theorem 1 is an extension of Greenberg's result we 
need to compute the Nakamura number of a q-maj ority rule o with q < n. q 
As Greenberg himself showed, a necessary and sufficient condition for any 
6 
subfamily IJ• of /j , of cardinality I�' I = r, to have nonempty intersection 
is q >f�1) n. q 
This inequality can be written r< f�J + 1. Ln-q 
Let v(n,q) be the largest integer which is strictly less than r_LJ. Ln-q 
Then liti' I .::. v(n,q) + 1 implies that c<)J1) "' $· 
Consequently the Nakamura number of q is v(n,q)+2, and so the q 
stability dimension for the q-maj ority rule is v(n,q). By definition 
w .::_ v(n,q) iff w < q/( ) • n-q 
Greenberg also showed that if A 
set of points, and p {p1, • • •  ,pn} a profile of transitive preferences 
on A, then the profile p could be extended over the abstract w-dimensional 
simplex 6 generated by A. As long as IAI w+l .::_ v(n,q}+l, then the 
preference correspondence for the q-maj ority rule would have a choice 
from 6. Indeed Greenberg's method gave a q-maj ority choice from A. 
More generally Nakamura [13] has shown that if A is a finite set 
of cardinality IAI .::_ v*(a)+l then the preference correspondence P , for a 
the arbitrary voting game cr, will be acyclic. Moreover if IAI > v*(a) +l 
then an acyclic profile on A can always be constructed is such a way 
that Pa itself is cyclic (See also [4], [S], [7]). 
These results for the finite alternative case suggest that Theorem 
1 can be extended to a more general result involving the non existence 
of voting cycles in dimension below v*(a). In the next section of 
the paper we obtain Theorem 1 essentially by showing that a voting game 
a exhibits no "local" cycles on a topological space W of dimension 
w .'.:_ v*(a) as long as individual preferences are continuous, Moreover 
the extension of Theorem 1 that we obtain provides a method for dealing 
with non-convex individual preference. 
Consider again the case of q-maj ority rule 1 a 1for a society of q 
size n. If q is strictly greater than I , then clearly any two coalitions 
in Jj must intersect, Thus v(a ) > 3 and so v*(a ) > 1. Thus a direct q q - q -
corollary of Theorem 1 is that if W is a convex compact subset of the 
real line and individual preference is semi convex and continuous then 
there is a choice for such a q-maj ority rule. Thus Theorem 1 may be 
7 
thought of as a generalization of proofs on the existence of a maj ority 
equilibrium when preferences are single peaked [3], 
Consider the situation however when individual preferences on a 
one dimensional admissible space W are not semi-convex. As Kramer and 
Klevorick [10) have shown, it is possible to construct a profile of 
such preferences on W such that the maj ority rule preference relation 
is cyclic. Consequently neither the theorems of Walker nor Greenberg 
can be used to show existence of an equilibrium. Kramer and Klevorick 
however showed, under the assumption of smooth preferences, that a 
local choice set was non empty, 
Here a point x is a local choice of P on W iff there is some neigh­a 
bourhood u of x such that pa (x) nu 
We shall use an adaptation of the Ky Fan Theorem to show that 
non existence of "local" cycles essentially implies the existence of 
a "local" choice set. This result holds in the absence of any convexity 
assumptions. If one imposes convexity then the "local" choice set and 
"global" choice set coincide. 
Greenberg also showed that if W was admissible but of dimension 
greater than q/(n-�then it was always possible to construct a profile 
of continuous semi-convex individual preferences such that the preference 
correspondence of the q-maj ority game had no choice. 
Strnad ( [22), (23)) extended Greenberg's method of proof to show 
that for an arbitrary non-collegial voting game a, if dimension(W) > v*(a)+l 
then a smooth profile u can be constructed on the admissible space W 
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such that there exists no choice of P0 from W. Indeed Strnad's procedure 
can be adapted to show that the cycle set IC(cr,u) will also be non 
empty, (see also (16] ). Thus the constraint that dimension(W) < v*(cr) 
is both necessary and sufficient for the non existence of local cycles 
and the existence of a choice, when individual preferences are both semi-
convex and continuous. 
2. EXISTENCE OF AN OPTIMUM 
We restrict attention first of all to the case where W is an open 
set in :Rw and preferences of the members of the society N are given 
by a profile of smooth utilities 
u 
(The following analysis except where indicated is also valid when W 
is a smooth manifold; see [15) whose notation we follow here). 
At each point x, the tangent space T W can be identified with R w, x 
and for each ieN, the derivative dui(x) of ui at x belongs to the 
topological space L(lR w, lR) of linear maps from ]R w to JR • Moreover 
dui:W + L(lR
w,lR) is continuous. If dui(x) is non-zero it may be 
represented by a vector pi(x) of unit length. Let 
IO(i) = fxew: dui (x) O} 
be the optima set of player i. Clearly IO(i) is closed in W, and 
pi:W 'IO(i) + lR 
w is continuous. 
For each i, let Hi(x) {v€lR
w:du.(x)(v) > O} be the preference ]. 
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cone of i at x and H. :W + lR w the preference field. For coalition M, ]. 
let 
�:W + lR 
w 
be the preference field defined by �(x) � Hi(x). 
The critical pare to set for M is IO(M, u) = {XE>W:�(x) cl>}• 
For a voting game cr, with£l its family of winning coalitions, the 
preference field H0:W + lR 
w is defined by H0(x) = �p HM(x) • 
The preference correspondence Pi:W + W for individual i is given by 
pi (x) {yEW:ui (y) > ui(x)} for each x• W. 
This in turn gives the 
preference correspondences PM' for Mb�, and p as in 
the previous section. cr 
Because of the smoothness assumption on preference, bhe preference fields 
so constructed satisfy a continuity property which we call S-continuity. 
A preference field H:W + Rw is called S-continuous iff for each xGW 
such tbat H(x) I cp the following properties are satisfied 
(a) H(x) is open in R w and does not contain O, (b) if v6H(x) 
then there is a neighbourhood U of x and a continuous function 
(also called a vector field) X:U + lRw such that X(x') = v for all 
x'c:U, (c) if X:U + lRw is a vector field, where U is a neighbourhood 
of x, and X(x) 6 H(x), then there is a neighbourhood U' of x in U 
such that X(x') G H(x') for all x' G U'. 
A second property that concerns us is whether the field is half 
open. A set 6 in lR w is half open iff there exists a linear function 
such that f(v) > O for all vee. A set {v1, ... ,vr} of 
vectors in Rw is called semipositively dependent iff there exists 
r 
a semipositive vector A= (A .•• ,A) such that L A.v. 0. If 1 r j=l J J 
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8 contains a semipositively dependent set of vectors then it cannot 
be half open. A preference field is called half open iff for all x 
such that H(x) f $, H(x) is half open. 
Clearly the preference field Hi:W + lR 
w for each iG N is S-continuous 
and half open, and therefore for each coalition MC N, � is also S-continuous 
and half open, For any voting game H0 will also be S-continuous but need 
not be half open. 
S-continuity of a preference field permits integration of the field 
in the following way. A smooth curve c:{O,l) + W from c(O) = x 
to y = limc(t) is called an integral curve of the field H from x to y 
t+l 
iff for each te[O,l) the derivative [c](z) at z = c(t)eW belongs to 
H(z). By S-continuity, if H(x) f $ then there exists some integral 
curve from x to a point y in a neighbourhood of x. 
For a voting game a and smooth profile u, we write YP}f whenever 
there is an integral curve from x to y for the preference field �· and 
write ypx whenever YP}f for some M!Z�. 
Note in particular that if �(x) = $ then YP}f for no y&W. 
On the other hand if �(x) f $ then there is some y�W such that ypMx' 
and thus ypx. 
Our analysis is concerned with the following three sets. 
Definition 
Let a be a voting game on W, and let u be a smooth profile. A 
point x belongs to 
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i) the infinitesimal optima set,IO(cr,u), for (cr,u) iff 
H0(x) = $ (i.e. xeIO(M,u) for all M��), 
ii) the infinitesimal cycle set, IC(cr,u), for (cr,u) iff H0(x) is 
not half open. 
iii) the local cycle set, LC(cr,u), iff for any neighbourhood U of 
x there exists a local p-cycle xpy1py2 •••Yr px where the 
preference curve associated with each component of this cycle 
belongs to U, 
In [14] it was shown that IC(cr,u) is open and if xGIC(cr,u) 
then there exists a neighbourhood U of x and a voting trajectory 
from x to any point z in U, Consequently IC(cr,u) belongs to LC(cr,u). 
On the other hand with weaker continuity assumptions it can be shown 
[17] that LC(cr,u) is contained in the closure of IC(cr,u). 
Note also that if a point x does not belong to LC(cr,u) then there is 
a neighbourhood U of x such that the preference correspondence P0:U + U, 
restricted to U, contains no cycles. 
We shall now show with the appropriate dimension restriction 
on the space W, that the set IC(cr,u), for any smooth profile u, must 
be empty. This in turn implies that there can exist no local cycles 
for the relation p, 
We require an alternative characterization of a point in IC(cr,u). 
For a voting game a and smooth profile u, and point X6W, let 
IJ (x) = {M€'if] :�(x) f �}. 
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For each M€fl (x) let pM(x) be the convex hull in JR 
w of the vectors 
{pi(x):ieM}. Since it is known that \i(x) = <P iff {p. (x) :i6 M} l. 
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are semipositively dependent {19,20], the set pM(x) is compact, convex and 
does not contain the origin. Define p0(x) 
By {14, lemma 2.1), xGIC(cr,u) iff p0(x) = $. 
Ccx) Pix). 
The set p0(x) has 
also been called the directional core or the set of undominated directions 
(12] of the game (cr,u) at x. 
Theorem 2 Let a be a voting game on an open set W in JR w, where 
w � v*(cr). Then IC(cr,u) = <P for any smooth profile u, 
Proof We show that, under the dimension restriction, at every 
point xeW it is the case that p0 (x) f ip. 
By Helly's Theorem (1), if {�1 • • • ,Aw+k
} , with k > O, is a family 
of convex compact sets in JRw such that the intersection of every 
subfamily of cardinality (w+l) is nonempty, then the intersection of 
the entire family is nonempty. 
Consider a subfamily}}' of;J (x) with cardinality it)' I� v*(cr)+l. 
By the definition of the Nakamura number, there exists a collegium C(j()'). 
Pick ieC<.£)'), Since i.s,t,l• C IJ (x), pi (x) 'f O. Moreover pi (x) e pM(x) 
for each Me iJ 1 , Thus 
$ f p pM(x). 
Furthermore each pM(x), for MeJl(x), is a compact convex set, Since 
any subfamily of {pM(x):M€.o/)(x)} 1 of cardinality at most v*(cr)+l, has 
non empty intersection, and w � v*(cr) by assumption, the entire family 
has nonempty intersection, and so p0(x) I �. Since this argument is 
valid at every point in W, IC(cr, u) = q,. 
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In the proof of this theorem no convexity assumptions on preference 
are required. Indeed the theorem is valid when W is a smooth manifold; 
the modification to the proof being that at any point on the boundary 
the tangent space TxW is defined to be isomorphic to a closed half 
space of JRw. Although the theorem shows non existence of local cycles, 
it might well be the case that the preference correspondence P0:W + W 
is cyclic. Consequently Walkers 124] theorem on the existence of a 
choice for an acyclic preference correspondence oh a compact space 
cannot be used to show existence of an equilibrium. However if W 
is admissible then we can adapt the Ky Fan Theorem to show existence 
of optima. 
When W is an admissible space of dimension w, define the tangent 
space T W at x to be the subset of JR w s. t. v�T W iff there exists yeW x x 
and ;\ € �, ;\ � O, such that v = ;\(y-x) . A preference field 
H:W +JR w is now required to satisfy H(x) C T W for all xeW. The x 
previous definitions of S-continuity and of the sets IO(o,u) etc. 
then go through with this modification. Since p0(x) 'f <P implies that 
x t IC(o,u), Theorem 2 is valid when W is an admissible space. 
We now show that when W is admissible and IC(cr,u) is empty then IO(cr,u) 
must be nonempty. 
w Given the voting game a, and a smooth profile u, let H0:W +JR 
be the preference field and define the preference correspondence 
ii :W + W by 
a 
i) 
Note first of all that at any point x�W,TxW is a cone in R 
w (i.e. 
if veT W then !.vli:T W for any strictly positive 1'€-lR). Thus H_ (x), x x �  
and hence H0(x), are cones in TxW. Moreover if H0(x) i � then there is 
some y(;W such that !.(y-x) e H0(x) and so yeii (x). o 
Theorem 3 If o is a voting game on an admissible set W and u is 
a smooth profile then IC(o,u) = $ implies that IO(o,u) 1 $. 
Proof i) We show first of all that the preference correspondence 
H is lower demi-continuous. o 
- -1 
Suppose that y l: H0 (x) for some x&W. 
Thus xeH0(y) and x = y+v for some velb(y). 
Let c:[O,l) + W be defined by 
c(t) y + tv • 
Clearly [c)(y) = v 
Consider the vector field X(z) = x-z. Then 
X(y) = (x-y) = v = [c](y). 
Since vGHJy), by S-continuity of H0 there is a neighbourhood V of y 
such that X(z)t::HJz) for all zGV. Thus for all zeV, x-zeHJz) and so 
x = z+(x-z) G H0(z). Hence V C ii 
-l (x). o 
- -1 -Hence H0 (x) is open and H0 is ldc. 
ii) By the definition of H0, at no point x is 
OGH (x). Thus o 
x </::ii (x). o 
If xGConH (x) then there exists a solution to x 
r 
where l A. 
j=l J 
r 
l !.. zj j=l J 
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By definition z. 
J 
x + v. where each vj e H (x). J o r 
Hence l 1'.v. = 0 for semipositive A= (1'1, • • • ,1.r). j=l J J 
By !14, lemma 3.5) this can be the case iff xeIC(o,u). 
Consequently if IC(o,u) = $ then H 0 is semi-convex. 
By the Ky Fan Theorem there exists a choice xe. W such that H0(x) 
But H (x) = $ iff H (x) = $. Hence IO(o,u) 1 $· o o 
Corollary 1 
• 
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ck. 
Let o be a voting game on an admissible set W in R w, where w ::_ v*(o). 
Then IO(o,u) i $ for any smooth profile u. 
By Theorem 2, IC(o,u) = $, and thus by Theorem 3, IO(o,u) 1 $ . 
• 
Note that if x t IO(o,u}, then from the definitions, there exists 
a point yG W such that YPt-fK for some M<:::i& , and so ye: P0(x) . Consequently 
x cannot belong to the choice set c(P0,W). Hence C (p0,W) belongs to 
IO(o,u). Corollary 1 does not show existence of the choice set c(P0,W) 
unless we assume additional convexity properties on preference. 
Say that a profile P = (P1, • • . ,Pn) of preference correspondences 
for society N satisfies the convexity property iff for each i.GN, then 
for xGW either Pi (x) = $ or there exists a vector pi (x) of x, of unit 
length, such that Pi(x) belongs to the half space 
Hi(x) {yGW:pi(x).(y-x) > O}, 
where pi(x).(y-x) is the scalar product of pi(x) and (y-x). 
As above,when P = (P1, . • •  ,Pn) satisfies the convexity property, 
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define i\i(x), pM(x), for each McN, and i\/x), p0(x) in the obvious way. 
With the convexity property it is clear that P0(x)C
H
0(x), for each 
xeM.· 
In the case of the smooth profile, u = (u1, • • •  ,un) satisfying the 
convexity property for each i�N, the cone Hi(x) may be identified with 
{yGW:dui(x)(y-x) > O
}. 
For such a profile, if xero(o,u) then P0(x) 
Thus we obtain the following corollary. 
Corollary 2 
Let a be a voting game on an admissible set W in Rw, where 
w 2. v*(a). Then, if u is a smooth profile satisfying the convexity 
property, the preference correspondence Pa given by this profile has 
a choice x in w. 
• 
We are now in a position to present a proof of Theorem 1 using the 
method of proof of Theorem 2. 
Theorem 4 Let a be a voting game on an admissible space W of 
dimension w, where w < v*(a). If P = (P1, • • •  ,Pn) is a preference 
profile which satisfies the convexity property, and if each Pi,i=l, • • •  ,n, 
is lower demi-continuous, then there exists a choice of p0 from W. 
Moreover for any x�W, there exists a neighbourhood U of x such that the 
preference correspondence Pa:U +U has no cycles. 
Proof We seek first of all to show that P is lower demi-continuous. 
0 
-1 Suppose that for some x,yeW, it is the case that yGPa (x). 
By definition this implies that x•Pa(y) and therefore, for some 
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Me£), that xGPM(y), and so xGP i (y) for all �M. 
-1 For each i&M,Pi (x) is 
open, and so there exists an open neighbourhood Ui of y �Ui, it is the case 
such that 
-1 that z�PM (x) 
for some ME: id • -1 Hence Uc Pa (x) and so P0 is lower demi-continuous. 
We now show Pa must be semi-convex. 
By assumption, for each i.GN, and each x�W, either Pi(x) 
or there exists pi (x)€lR 
w such that 
Pi (x) C 
H
i (x) 
{y6W:pi(x). (y-x) > O
}. 
<P· 
Define i\i(x), H0(x), pM(x) and p0(x) as before and let 
IC(a,P) {xeW:x�ConH (x)} • a 
Proceed exactly as in the proof of Theorem 2 to show that at every 
point xew, pa(x) f <P· 
As in the proof of Theorem 3 this implies that xeConH (x) for no xGW. a 
Consequently IC(a,P) is empty and so both H : W  +W and P :W +W are a a 
semi convex. 
By the Ky Fan Theorem, there exists a choice of H0, and thus of Pa' 
from W. Moreover since IC(a,P) = cj>, at every point xGW it is the 
case that there exists a neighbourhood U of x such that the correspond-
ence Pa:U + U: x t+ Pa(x)l'"\U is acyclic. 
• 
Proof of Theorem 1 
By assumption each Pi is continuous and therefore lower demi-
continuous. 
If Pi(x) � $• then it is both open and semi convex. Thus there 
exists an open half space Hi(x), in E. 
w, which contains Pi(x). 
Thus P = (P1, • • •  ,Pn) satisfies the conditions on preference of 
Theorem 4. The result follows 
CONCLUSION 
The principal result of this paper is that, given a voting game, 
if the policy space is of dimension no greater than the stability 
dimension v*(cr), then at every point x there exists a nonempty 
directional core p0(x). 
The directional core p0(x) at point x may also be thought of as 
a generalized gradient of the social welfare function associated with 
the voting procedure. The existence of this generalized gradient at 
every point is effectively a necessary and sufficient condition that 
the voting procedure is well behaved. It also turns out that various 
planning procedures that have been suggested to allocate public and 
private goods are associated with integral curves of this generalized 
gradient. See [12], [25] for an extensive discussion, 
Although the analysis has been conducted in terms of a voting game, 
the procedures can be used for more general coalition decision making 
mechanisms, For example suppose we require a social preference 
correspondence P:W � W to be continuous. Then by [8), [23] the mechanism 
19 
must essentially be a local voting game, with a Nakamura number that 
may vary at different points in the policy space, Nonetheless the 
procedure used here can be used to determine whether a generalised social 
preference correspondence of this form exhibits an equilibrium. 
Finally,when p0(x) = $ at some point x for such a procedure, 
manipulation of the agenda can lead to almost all points near enough to 
x [11]. Thus the dimensionality restriction presented here is one which 
is sufficient to prevent manipulation of this kind. 
20 
21 
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